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I. INTRODUCTION
It is more difficult today than it was a decade ago for a state prisoner to
persuade a federal court to review the propriety of his state court conviction
or sentence. Even when a state prisoner does persuade a federal court to
consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition, he is less likely than he was
in the past to obtain the relief requested.
This change in the role of federal courts reflects a number of factors.
First, state courts today are more willing to apply federal constitutional re-
quirements in state cases, thereby lessening the necessity for federal court
review of the propriety of state court convictions and sentences. Whether this
willingness will continue if there is little possibility of subsequent federal
court review is an important question to which no clear answer is readily
apparent.
Second, federal judges are increasingly convinced that the state courts,
rather than the federal courts, ought to have the major responsibility for
deciding important criminal justice policy questions. This conviction results
from the belief of some federal judges that federal courts attempted too much
in trying to run the nation's schools, prisons, and mental hospitals and that
there should be less rather than more federal court involvement.' Increased
reliance on state courts is reflected in proposals to limit federal habeas corpus
to cases in which the petitioner had no opportunity for a full and fair hearing in
state court.2
Third, some of the rules imposed by federal courts, such as the exclu-
sionary rule, have been criticized because they cost more by interfering with
effective law enforcement than they provide in protecting against abuse of law
enforcement authority. This view is reflected in assertions that federal court
relief should be limited to situations in which the error concerns the integrity
of the fact-finding process and the petitioner demonstrates a colorable claim
of innocence.3
Federal courts-the United States Supreme Court in particular-have
adopted a number of procedural requirements that a state prisoner must meet
* Jackson Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983,
Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD. 557.
2. See infra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
3. Letter from William H. Rehnquist to Warren E. Burger (Sept. 23, 1971) (on file at the Administrative
Office of United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
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to persuade a federal court to even consider the merits of his claim. These
include, most notably, a demonstration that the petitioner has complied with
state procedural requirements-usually a proper objection to the evidence,
the jury instruction, or the guilty plea procedure;4 a demonstration that all
state remedies have been exhausted for all claims contained in the petition for
habeas corpus; 5 and a demonstration that the factual conclusions of the state
court not only are in error, but also are so obviously wrong that they have no
support in the record, or that they have been decided without a full and fair
hearing in the state court.6
Federal courts have also imposed limitations on the kinds of substantive
issues that a state prisoner can raise. The most notable limitation is that of
Stone v. Powell,7 which precludes access to federal court for state prisoners
claiming a violation of the fourth amendment unless the petitioner can show a
lack of a full and fair hearing in state court. At the same time, however,
several Supreme Court decisions have permitted a state prisoner to raise
some new types of issues. Most notable are Jackson v. Virginia8 and Sand-
strom v. Montana,9 the former allowing a petitioner to question the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, the latter allowing a petitioner to challenge the pro-
priety of the jury instructions. In the past federal habeas corpus relief had
been unavailable for claims of insufficient evidence or improper jury instruc-
tions, both of which could be raised only in state court and only by means of a
timely appeal.' 0
As a consequence of recent changes, a new relationship is developing
between federal and state courts that reflects not only the increase in the
kinds of substantive issues that a petitioner can raise through federal habeas
corpus, but also the increase in the procedural requirements that a petitioner
must meet to gain meaningful access to the federal court.
These changes are likely to create an increasingly important role for the
state courts in reviewing the propriety of the conviction and sentence of state
prisoners. Although the symbolic significance of United States Supreme
4. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); see Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Need for Reform, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036, 1038-41 (1982); Comment, FederalHabeas CorpusReview of Unintentionally
Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 981 (1982).
5. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
6. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); 455 U.S. 591 (1982). In 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (Sumner!). the Court
directed the Ninth Circuit to reexamine its decision in light of the holding that federal courts must presume that
state court findings of fact are correct. The Ninth Circuit reinstated its original decision, stating that the
principles of Sumner Idid not apply to its mixed finding of law and fact. In 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (Sumner!!), the
Court again remanded, holding that the Ninth Circuit had disagreed with the state court on the facts. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit was required under Sumner I to either uphold the state court's decision or show that the state
court's finding of fact with which it disagreed was not supported by the record.
7. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
8. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
9. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
10. Young v. Alabama, 443 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 976 (1971) (sufliency of the evidence
not reviewable by habeas corpus); Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 905,
reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 1002 (1970) (improper jury instructions must amount to clear denial of due process to be
reviewable by habeas corpus).
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Court decisions like Jackson v. Virginia and Sandstrom v. Montana remains
great, the practical impact of these cases is an unwarranted rise in state
prisoner expectations. In reality the likelihood of a favorable decision in
behalf of the state prisoner in federal court is increasingly remote, particularly
because of the difficulty of meeting the procedural prerequisites for federal
habeas corpus review and, when review is gained, the reluctance of federal
courts to reverse the state court conviction on the merits.
II. THE REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH STATE PRISONER ACCESS
TO FEDERAL COURT BY A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
The 1960s generated considerable criticism of federal court review of
state court convictions. Most of the criticism came from outside the federal
judiciary. In part it reflected opposition to some of the Warren Court's deci-
sions. " Much of the criticism came from state court judges who were offend-
ed by the thought that a single federal district court judge could reverse a
conviction considered proper by the state trial court, the intermediate court of
appeals, and the state supreme court.' 2 The availability of federal habeas
review was also criticized for preventing finality of convictions and thus
lessening the chance that the inmate would devote his time to rehabilitative
efforts. "3
In the 1970s the criticism by state judges subsided, and a much more
harmonious relationship developed between the state and federal judici-
aries. ' 4 This may reflect the work of the state-federal committees formed to
discuss points of tension between state and federal courts.15 It may also
evidence the change in the expansive attitude of the United States Supreme
Court. But, for the most part, it seemed to demonstrate the increased willing-
ness of state courts to deal with important federal constitutional questions or
to recognize that their failure to do so would result in federal court involve-
ment. In a recent interview the very thoughtful Robert Sheran, then Chief
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, responded to the question whether
too much federal court "judicial activism" had occurred:
11. See Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be
Eliminated?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740, 743-48 (1972).
12. LaFrance, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: Who's Responsible?, 58 A.B.A. J. 610 (1972).
13. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 452 (1963). Regarding the effect on rehabilitation, see Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal
Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Presumed, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701, 710-12 (1972). Judge Lay says,
-'It seems unrealistic to say that channeling the quest for freedom away from the courtroom door will necessarily
turn the prisoner's attention toward the process of rehabilitation." Id. at 711. Today rehabilitation is no longer a
priority of correctional treatment.
14. Some state officials still criticize federal court review of state court convictions. See Florida Attorney
General Jim Smith's argument that United States magistrates should not be allowed to make recommended
findings of fact contrary to the factual conclusions reached by the state courts. Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-
A Need for Reform, 73 J. CRI,1. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036 (1982).
15. See Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be
Eliminated?. 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740, 755 (1972).
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My response is that this criticism is exaggerated for two reasons. The first is
that courts, whether they be the United States Supreme Court or the supreme
courts of the states, do not deal with difficult interpretations of the Constitution
unless a problem has been permitted to develop that is so aggravated and so
extensive that resolution is demanded by the strongest kinds of public policy.
Even then, the courts will take on those problems with the greatest reluctance and
always subject to being overridden by constitutional amendment or, in the case of
a legislative interpretation, by reenactment or rephrasing by the legislature.
The second reason is that the charge of excessive activisim on the part of the
federal court system vis-h-vis state court systems comes about because state court
systems are not, or at least in the past were not, as attentive as they should have
been to their responsibilities to recognize the Constitution of the United States and
the laws passed pursuant thereto as the supreme law of the land. The reason the
United States Supreme Court entered into the series of decisions, which began in
1963, dealing with the trial of criminal cases in state courts is that in many in-
stances over a period of two decades state courts had not dealt in effective and
aggressive ways with clear violations of federal constitutional rights occurring in
the cases before them.
The point is that justice abhors a vacuum. In the relationship between the
federal courts and the state courts, the most effective way of avoiding reluctant
federal action to correct problems occurring in the states is for state courts to take
the initiative and deal with those problems in aggressive and constructive ways. 16
Instead of continuing the earlier criticism of the federal judiciary, the
Conference of State Court Chief Justices has more recently turned its atten-
tion to improving the capacity of the state courts to apply appropriate consti-
tutional standards, thus limiting, if not eliminating, the necessity for federal
court involvement. The proposed State Justice Institute Act' 7 reflects this
effort. As a consequence of the Conference's activities, federal habeas corpus
no longer is the irritant to state court judges that it once was. Therefore, one
would assume that the agitation for limiting federal habeas review of state
court convictions would lessen and that habeas corpus would no longer be a
major issue in federal-state relations.
Actually, although outside criticism has lessened during the past decade,
members of the federal judiciary have become increasingly dissatisfied with
the scope of federal review of state convictions. This dissatisfaction has been
evident in a number of decisions that have restricted the scope of federal
habeas corpus review; 8 it reflects a feeling by federal judges that federal
16. 13 THE THIRD BRANCH I (March 1981) (interview with Chief Justice Robert Sheran, Chairman of the
Conference of Chief Justices).
17. S. 2387, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S9, 443-46 (daily ed. July 21, 1980). Senate Bill 2387
passed the Senate on July 21, 1980, but the House took no action on it. It has been reintroduced in the current
session. A major purpose of the State Justice Institute is to improve the capacity of state courts to handle, in an
informed way, claims of violations of federal constitutional rights.
For a discussion of the adequacy of the state courts' response to federal constitutional claims, see Freund,
Remarks at Symposium on Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. REV. 27, 30 (1964); Note, The Burden of
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions from State Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REV. 486, 501 (1966).
18. McKeldin v. Rose, 631 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969 (1980) (absence of counsel at
preliminary hearing was harmless error not warranting habeas corpus relief); United States ex rel. Little v.
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courts attempted too much in their effort to run the nation's schools, prisons,
mental hospitals, and other programs that had traditionally been the sole
responsibility of the states.' 9 Federal judges have also been concerned about
the dramatic growth in the number of prisoner conditions-of-confinement
cases during the past decade. An illustration of this attitude appears in the
following quotation from a dissenting opinion by Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Posner:
Perhaps this apocalypse is already upon us. Our criminal prosecutions are
becoming-to use an ugly but apt word-multiphasic. The familiar first phase
comprises the criminal trial itself and any direct appeal from it. After the convic-
tion has been affirmed, the phase of postconviction proceedings begins-first the
state postconviction proceedings (I am speaking of state prosecutions, since the
present case involves a state prisoner), then federal habeas corpus and maybe,
after the sentence has been served, coram nobis as well. The third phase will
meanwhile be getting under way. It consists of the section 1983 lawsuits, often
numerous, complaining about mistreatment or neglect by prison officials and
employees. When the prisoner is released from jail or has exhausted his imagina-
tion in devising section 1983 claims, the fourth phase begins, consisting of lawsuits
against the prisoner's lawyers and the judges in the earlier phases complaining that
by failing to secure his civil rights they violated those rights. When all this futile
litigation has finally ended, the criminal is conscious not of the wrong he did but of
his own multitudinous claims to justice whose vindication an unjust legal system
kept always just outside his reach. He emerges not chastened, but full of pas-
sionate resentment.2 °
Judge Posner makes several important assumptions about prisoner litiga-
tion. First, prisoner claims are usually without merit. What few have merit can
be dealt with by the market place: "If it is a meritorious claim there will be
money in it for a lawyer; if it is not it ought not to be forced on some hapless
unpaid lawyer."' Second, federal habeas corpus review, along with condi-
tions-of-confinement litigation, is part of the "apocalypse" rather than a
needed and healthy assurance that federal constitutional requirements will be
observed. Third, the victims of all of this are the lawyers and judges, including
federal judges, who, according to state prisoners, have failed to secure the
prisoners' civil rights.
Ciuros, 452 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (petitioner must show extraordinary circumstances to warrant habeas
corpus relief); Guerrero v. Harris, 461 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (absence of interpreter at stage at which
petitioner pleaded guilty was harmless error not warranting habeas corpus relief).
19. See supra note I.
20. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting). It is understandable
that federal judges perceive prisoners as overly litigious. They know of only those state prisoners who attempt
litigation in federal court. Some of these prisoners bring repeated, clearly frivolous, and therefore annoying
petitions. But not all prisoners are litigious and not all petitions are frivolous. During the summer of 1982 the
students in the University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons Program
interviewed all male prisoners entering the Wisconsin prison system between June 15 and August 15, 1982. A
total of 270 were interviewed. Less than half expressed any concern whatsoever over the propriety of their
conviction, and of those who were concerned only a fraction stated that they were not guilty of the crime of
which they were convicted. Ongoing study (working papers available at Legal Assistance to Institutionalized
Persons Program, 913 University Ave., Madison, Wisconsin 53715).
21. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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To the extent that other members of the federal judiciary share Judge
Posner's perception, it is not surprising that they support limiting the avail-
ability of federal court review of state convictions. What is somewhat surpris-
ing is that most of the current limitations are being imposed on 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas corpus actions rather than on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conditions-of-
confinement litigation. Although state prisoner litigation in the federal courts
has greatly increased, the increase has been attributable largely to section
1983 conditions-of-confinement litigation rather than to section 2254 chal-
lenges to state court convictions.22
If the federal-state issue were primarily the annoyance that state court
judges feel when overruled by a single federal judge, as it was in the 1960s,
then limitations on federal habeas corpus should limit the irritation. But if the
federal-state issue is the usurpation by federal judges of decision-making
responsibility that would better be left to the states, then the major problem
lies not with section 2254 litigation but rather with section 1983 litigation.
Section 1983 cases bypass state administrative and judicial procedures com-
pletely while section 2254 cases require that the petitioner exhaust state
remedies and that the federal court grant at least some deference to the
decisions of the state courts. For reasons that are not entirely apparent,
federal courts have been willing to impose limitations on the availability of
section 2254 habeas corpus review, but have been unwilling to impose limita-
tions on the availability of section 1983 suits for prisoners complaining about
the conditions of their confinement. Indeed, congressional action was needed
to empower the district judge hearing a section 1983 suit to require state
prisoners to exhaust readily available and adequate administrative grievance
procedures prior to bringing action in federal court, a requirement that federal
courts have declined to adopt. 23
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPuS REVIEW
During the past decade Congress has considered repeated proposals to
restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus review for state prisoners. It
has not yet adopted any of these proposals, but the executive branch con-
tinues to urge that Congress impose restrictions, and one such proposal is
presently pending.24
22. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 8 (1980), for a discussion of the growth of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
cases. The number of cases grew from 3,348 in 1972 to 11,195 in 1979. Id. In contrast, during the same period the
number of state prisoner habeas cases (28 U.S.C. § 2254) declined from 7,949 to 7,123. AD. OFF. U.S. CTS..
1979 ANN. REP. 61.
23. See Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 330-31 (1979).
24. See Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Need for Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036
(1982), which discusses various legislative proposals made to Congress.
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The judicial and legislative branches have also acted, through the exer-
cise of the rule-making power. The Court approved a set of rules to govern
section 2254 proceedings; these were adopted, with several amendments, by
Congress effective February 1, 1977.2 Among the rules adopted is Rule 9,
which attempts to deal with the problem of delayed or successive petitions.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in a series of recent cases, has adopted
additional procedural requirements that a state prisoner must meet before
federal habeas corpus review will be available. It has also, to some extent,
reduced the scope of substantive issues that can be raised by federal habeas
corpus, although it has allowed some new issues to be raised. 26
Following is a brief discussion of some of the United States Department
of Justice proposals to limit the scope of federal habeas corpus review. Al-
though Congress has not adopted these proposals, they continue to be made.
Many of the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court appeared in earlier
legislative proposals advanced by several members of the Department of
Justice, one of whom, William H. Rehnquist, is now a member of the Court
and author of a number of the opinions limiting the availability of federal
habeas corpus review.
In 1971 Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist wrote to the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court asking that the Judicial
Conference of the United States consider certain legislative proposals of the
Department of Justice designed to modify the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus.27 In his letter Mr. Rehnquist discussed three legislative proposals:
first, to limit habeas corpus to claims that "affect the reliability of the fact
finding process"; second, to require, in addition, that the petitioner show that
the constitutional violation (which affected the reliability of the fact-finding
process) resulted in his conviction despite a "colorable showing of inno-
cence"; and third, and most far-reaching, to provide that a state court deci-
sion on the merits would preclude federal court review.
Mr. Rehnquist favored the first and second suggestions, that the error
must "affect the reliability of the fact finding process" and that petitioner
must demonstrate a "colorable showing of innocence." His support of the
third proposal, that state action on the merits preclude federal review, was
weaker: "A primary deficiency in a statutory overruling of Brown is that it
would break sharply with the current decisions of the court, and severely limit
the rights of prisoners to seek federal relief. Therefore the opposition to such
a proposal might be considerable."- 28
25. 28 U.S.C.A. Foil. § 2254, Rule 9 (1976).
26. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
27. Letter from William H. Rehnquist to Warren E. Burger (September 23, 1971) (on file at the Administra-
tive Office of United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
28. Letter to Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard, then Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Aug. 20, 1971) (attached to the Sept. 23 letter to the Chief Justice; see supra note 27).
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In a letter to Congressman Celler of June 21, 1972,29 Attorney General
Kleindienst recommended legislation that would limit federal habeas corpus
to claims "(1) which were not theretofore raised and determined in a State
court, and (2) which there was no fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to
have raised and determined in a State court, and (3) which could not there-
after be raised and determined in a State court.- 30 In addition, claims that
were not and could not be raised in state court could be raised on federal
habeas corpus review only if they met the additional requirement that the
constitutional right allegedly violated "has as its primary purpose the protec-
tion of the reliability of ... the fact finding process at the trial." 3' Finally,
petitioner could gain relief only if he could also show that "a different result
would probably have obtained if the violation of the constitutional right had
not occurred.
3 2
Proposed legislation incorporating the views of the Department of Justice
was drafted and introduced, but was not enacted by the Congress. 33 Propo-
nents said that the proposed legislation would reduce the work of the federal
courts, the district courts in particular; that it would promote finality of con-
victions and thus rehabilitation; and that it would minimize the irritant to
federal-state relations.34 Opponents urged that the proposal would effectively
deny a federal forum and habeas corpus relief to most state prisoners alleging
a violation of constitutional rights, a result not justified by concern over case
load, offender rehabilitation, or tensions between federal and state courts. 35
A special committee on habeas corpus of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, although it acknowledged that a revision of the habeas corpus
statutes was desirable, recommended that the legislation proposed by the
Department of Justice be disapproved. 36 The committee suggested that it
would be better to enact legislation that would encourage state courts to
review all alleged errors in a single postconviction procedure; to notify the
defendant, after the state postconviction procedure, that state remedies had
been exhausted; to furnish counsel to decide whether federal review is fea-
sible and desirable; and then to limit to 120 days the period within which a
petition for habeas corpus would have to be filed. The committee provided
exceptions to the time limit for newly discovered evidence and changes in the
29. 119 CONG. REC. 2,222-26 (1973).
30. Id. at 2224.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2224-25.
33. S. 567, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 2221-22 (1976).
34. See Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners-Reform or Revoca-
tion?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221, 1245-52 (1973).
35. Id. at 1245.
36. W. Hoffman, Chairman's Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 1973) (on file at
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.). See a similar proposal in Weick.
Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated?. 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 740, 750-55 (1972).
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law.37 These proposals were concerned primarily with finality and with the
great time delay in some habeas corpus actions. They were not intended to
lessen the role of federal courts nor to limit habeas corpus reviews to claims
relating to the integrity of the fact-finding process in which petitioner brought
a colorable claim of innocence. To date these proposals have not received
favorable congressional action.
In the past decade discussion of legislative limitations on the availability
of federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners has continued. Most recently
the Reagan administration has urged the adoption of S. 2903, the Federal
Intervention Reform Act of 1982. 38 This proposed legislation would bring
about essentially four changes. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 would be amended to
make clear that federal issues would have to be raised in state court as re-
quired by state procedure, unless the failure to raise them resulted from state
action that had violated the Constitution or laws of the United States; or
unless the federal right were newly recognized by the Supreme Court subse-
quent to the procedural default and would be applied retroactively; or unless
the factual predicate could not have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence prior to the procedural default. Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2244
would also be amended to provide for a one-year period of limitation that
would run from the time state remedies were exhausted, the impediment to
filing in federal court has been removed, the right asserted has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court, or the factual predicate upon which the claim is
based was undiscoverable by the exercise of reasohable diligence. Third, 28
U.S.C. § 2254 would be amended to preclude raising any claim that had been
fully and fairly adjudicated in state proceedings. Fourth, on any issues that
could still be raised in federal court, the state court findings of fact would be
considered correct unless the presumption were rebutted by clear and con-
vincing evidence.39
The most recent proposals differ from earlier proposals in at least two
respects. First, they drop all reference to the integrity of the fact-finding
process and the requirement of a colorable showing of innocence. Rather,
they emphasize the finality of state court proceedings. Second, the one-year
period of limitations starts to run at the time state remedies are exhausted
whether or not the state prisoner is informed of this fact and whether or not he
has the assistance of counsel in determining whether a basis exists for bring-
ing a petition for habeas corpus in federal court.
The recent proposals are similar to earlier proposals of the Department of
Justice that would effectively preclude federal review and would limit the
37. W. Hoffman, Chairman's Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 1973) (on file at
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
38. S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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opportunity to raise federal constitutional issues to those few cases in which
the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Should the current proposals of the
Department of Justice be adopted by Congress, access to federal habeas
corpus would effectively be closed to state prisoners who claim that their
convictions or sentences resulted from state processes that violated the
Constitution.
IV. THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS
The habeas rules that became effective in 1977 make no effort to limit
federal court review except in the provisions of Rule 9 dealing with delayed or
successive petitions. 4' Rule 9 provides that a petition may be dismissed if the
state is prejudiced by a delay in the filing of the petition and the petitioner fails
to demonstrate that the petition is based on grounds that could not have been
discovered earlier by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The rule also pro-
vides for the dismissal of a successive petition if the issue raised was previ-
ously decided on the merits or if the failure to include an issue in a prior
petition constitutes an abuse of the writ. The advisory committee note em-
phasizes that the rule grants discretion to the trial judge to consider or reject
the petition if it is filed late without reason or if it is an abuse of the writ
because the issue was deliberately withheld from a prior petition. 42 The
successive petition issue has taken on new significance because of the deci-
sion in Rose v. Lundy,43 which requires a petition containing exhausted and
unexhausted claims to be dismissed. The question that remains after Lundy is
whether a petitioner who redrafts his petition to eliminate the unexhausted
claims will thereby be precluded under Rule 9(b) from later asserting those
claims after he has exhausted available state remedies. Also, the Chief Justice
has asked the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to give further attention
to the scope of Rule 9.44
V. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSING PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
Three relatively recent cases have had a significant impact on habeas
corpus procedure. Engle v. Isaac45 raised the greatest procedural hurdle for
the petitioner to surmount. In Engle the Court held that a petitioner's proce-
41. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 9.
42. An important difference does exist between the approach of the rules, which is to give the United States
District Court judge the authority to deal with individual cases when an abuse of the writ occurs, and the
approach of proposed legislation and recent cases that are designed to prevent the judge from considering cases
that may have merit.
43. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
44. See letter from Walter Hoffman to the members of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Apr. 25,
1983) and attached opinion of the Chief Justice in Spalding v. Aiken, No. 82-665 (Apr. 18, 1983), denying
certiorari. This material is on file at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.
45. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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dural default precluded him from raising the claim that the burden of persua-
sion for self-defense had been placed on him contrary to the holding of In re
Winship/ 6 The Court reasoned that the precedential basis for requiring an
at-trial objection existed because In re Winship had been decided before the
trial. The Court acknowledged that an able defense lawyer may not have
recognized at the time of the trial the possibility of an objection to imposing on
the defendant the burden of persuasion for an affirmative defense. 47 The
Court concluded, however, that the Constitution "guarantees criminal defen-
dants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not ensure that
defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional
claim." 4 The Court rejected the argument that the procedural default should
not constitute a bar to federal habeas corpus relief when the constitutional
error affects "the truth finding function of the trial."' 49 In his dissent in Engle
v. Isaac Justice Brennan wrote, "In so holding, the Court ignores the mani-
fest differences between claims that affect the truth finding function of the
trial and claims that do not." 50
The obvious conclusion regarding both the proposed legislation and
Engle v. Isaac is that they emphasize state court procedures but no longer
give attention to whether the alleged error casts doubt on the state prisoner's
actual guilt of the crime for which he was convicted. It is evident after Engle
v. Isaac that Professor Seidman was right:
This unwillingness [to substitute the judgment of a federal judge for that of a state
judge] stems not from Judge Friendly's reluctance to use judicial resources for the
benefit of a guilty defendant, but rather from Professor Bator's view that ultimate
truths such as guilt and innocence can never be authoritatively established and
that federal oversight must therefore be limited to the assurance of fair pro-
cedures.
51
46. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
47. 456 U.S. 107, 133 (1982). Allowing a defense attorney to raise later an objection that he did not
recognize at the trial creates a practical difficulty: it encourages defense counsel to make formal objections to
everything the trial judge does. The resulting complexity and delay probably cause a greater burden on state
court procedures than may be justified by subsequent federal court enforcement of state court procedural
requirements. Put another way, a serious question arises whether Engle v. Isaac is designed to help state courts
or rather to help federal courts by limiting the opportunity of state prisoners to bring petitions for habeas corpus
in the federal court.
48. Id. at 134.
49. Id. at 129. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 467 (1980): -Wainwright seemingly mandates the
continued incarceration of factually innocent defendants in order to deter defense attorney misconduct." In his
thoughtful article Seidman concludes that the Burger court has not stressed the issue of individual guilt or
innocence. Rather, it has focused on the need for convictions to achieve broad social objectives, such as
deterrence.
50. 456 U.S. 107, 149 (1982) (Brennan, I., dissenting).
51. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change i Criminal
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 459 (1980). The Friendly position that habeas corpus relief should be
reserved for cases in which a colorable claim of innocence exists is set forth in Friendly, Is Innocence Irrel-
evant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). The Bator position that
habeas corpus relief should be limited to situations in which state procedures have been inadequate is set forth in
Bator. Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
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In the second of the recent cases, Rose v. Lundy,52 the Court held that a
habeas corpus petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims
must be dismissed. The petitioner may resubmit the petition without the
unexhausted claims, but in doing so he risks the possibility that the Court will
subsequently preclude, under Rule 9(b), his raising those issues in a later
action: "Thus a prisoner who decides to proceed only with his exhausted
claims and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted claims risks dismissal of
subsequent federal petitions.",
53
In the majority opinion Justice O'Connor stressed that the decision will
increase the opportunity for state courts "to review all claims of unconstitu-
tional error" and will aid federal courts because "federal claims that have
been fully exhausted in state courts will more often be accompanied by a
complete factual record to aid the federal courts in their review.
' '5
In dissent, Justice Stevens urged that "the availability of habeas corpus
relief should depend primarily on the character of the alleged constitutional
violation and not on the procedural history underlying the claim."' 55 The
claims that should be afforded federal review are
those errors that are so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying
judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which that judgment was ob-
tained .... Errors of this kind justify collateral relief no matter how long a judgment
may have been final and even though they may not have been preserved properly in
the original trial.
56
The majority emphasized the need to utilize the appropriate state pro-
cedures; the minority, the need to open the doors of the federal courts to
claimants who raise serious doubt about their guilt of the crime for which they
were convicted, doubt created by state court failure to conform to federal
constitutional requirements.
In Sumner v. Mata57 the Court had held that state court findings of fact
are binding on the federal court unless the latter can properly conclude that
the factual findings are not supported by the record. Again it seemed clear
that the Supreme Court's emphasis was on the adequacy of the state pro-
cedures rather than the nature of the petitioner's claim, whether or not it
contained a colorable claim of innocence. Subsequent to Mata, however, the
Supreme Court decided Marshall v. Lonberger,58 the third important case. In
Marshall the Court sustained the trial court's conclusion that a guilty plea had
been voluntarily and intelligently made even though (a) a guilty plea entered in
the state of Illinois in a previous conviction for intent to kill left doubt whether
52. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
53. Id. at 521.
54. Id. at 518-19.
55. Id. at 547-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. 449 U.S. 539 (1981); 455 U.S. 591 (1982). See supra note 6.
58. 51 U.S.L.W. 4113 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
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the petitioner knew he was pleading guilty to attempted murder, and (b) the
Ohio trial judge, when asked to admit the Illinois guilty plea as evidence that
the petitioner had previously been guilty of an offense requiring proof of a
purpose to kill, made no explicit finding on this factual issue. Justice Rehn-
quist, speaking for the five-Justice majority, said that the trial court's conclu-
sion that the plea had been voluntary required a finding that the petitioner
knew he was charged with attempted murder and knew he was pleading guilty
to attempted murder. Further, the Court presumed that this probable factual
conclusion by the Ohio trial judge was correct.5 9 Thus the Court deferred to
the Illinois court, which had failed to make an adequate record that the peti-
tioner was charged with attempted murder and knew he was pleading guilty to
attempted murder, and to the Ohio trial court, which had admitted the guilty
plea into evidence without making any explicit factual finding that the peti-
tioner knew he was pleading guilty to attempted murder (a fact petitioner
denied in his testimony in the Ohio trial court).
It would be difficult to explain Marshall by referring to the Court's desire
to encourage state procedures that are reliable enough to obviate relitigation
of the claim on federal habeas corpus review. Neither the Illinois guilty plea
nor the Ohio trial court decision admitting the plea represented desirable and
adequate state court procedure.
VI. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH DECISIONS REGARDING
THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPuS ARE Now BASED?
Neither the current legislative proposals nor recent Supreme Court deci-
sions emphasize the possibility that an innocent person has been found guilty
as the result of a constitutional violation by a state court. Nor do they empha-
size ensuring that the federal habeas claim is pursued without unreasonable
delay. Until recently it seemed clear that the important issue was rather the
adequacy of the state court procedure. It was assumed that adequate state
court procedures could fairly assess defendants' claims of federal constitu-
tional violations and, therefore, that increased reliance on the state courts
would substantially reduce the habeas corpus burden placed on the federal
courts.
This assumption seemed to explain Engle v. Isaac, which requires resort
to state court procedural requirements, and Rose v. Lundy, which, according
to Justice O'Connor, gives maximum opportunity for state courts to consider
claims of constitutional violations and to make adequate factual records that
would facilitate federal court review should that occur. More recently, how-
ever, in Marshall the Supreme Court sustained a conviction in which the
Illinois state court guilty plea procedures had clearly been inadequate and the
Ohio trial judge had failed to make explicit findings of fact. The Supreme
59. Id. at 4117.
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Court is now denying federal habeas corpus relief even when a colorable
claim of innocence does exist and when the state court procedures were
inadequate. The Court's actions are consistent with the oft rejected proposal
to Congress that federal habeas corpus review be denied whenever the valid-
ity of the claim has been adjudicated in state court. 60
Under Marshall the state court adjudication of a constitutional claim has
been adequate if the state judge rejects the claim and if this rejection can
logically be based only on facts that would indicate no constitutional violation
occurred. This assumed factual "conclusion" binds the federal court even
when the state court has recorded no actual findings of fact.
VII. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALL THIS? SANDSTROM V. MONTANA
AND ITS AFTERMATH-A CURRENT ILLUSTRATION
In Sandstrom v. Montana6 1 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
because the jury instruction had created an impermissibly great risk that the
jury would not understand that the prosecution had to prove the existence of
the required mental state, intent to kill, beyond a reasonable doubt. The risk
of confusion arose from the instruction that "the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."-62
The decision appeared to be significant at the time because it affirmed
that the principle of In re Winship-that the prosecution must prove the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt-was so important that a
conviction would be reversed if the jury instruction created a possibility that
the jury would misunderstand the principle. It seemed clear that any error
caused by such an instruction affected the integrity of the fact-finding process
and, therefore, the decision would have to be applied retroactively. 63 Further-
more, the error was so significant that it could not be considered harmless. 64
Because many state convictions had been based on instructions similar to that
given in Sandstrom, state prisoners came to expect successful federal habeas
corpus challenges to their convictions. Actually, such challenges were suc-
cessful in only a few cases. Engle v. Isaac prevented the need to reverse
convictions by holding that counsel should have objected to the instructions
(although most lawyers thought it would be futile to object to an instruction
that had been given routinely throughout the country for many years). Engle
was not the only answer to the question of erroneous jury instructions on the
burden of proof. Many state appellate courts confronted the issue on the
merits even though defense counsel had not objected to the instruction when
60. S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(b) (1982).
61. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
62. Id. at 515.
63. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
64. Connecticut v. Johnson, 51 U.S.L.W. 4175 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983).
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it was given. 65 In these cases Engle v. Isaac would not preclude federal court
review. How state and federal courts have reacted to these cases is illustrated
by the experiences of Wisconsin and of the Seventh Circuit.
After Sandstrom, Wisconsin trial and intermediate appellate courts
reached differing results on the constitutionality of Wisconsin's "natural and
probable consequence" instruction. The instruction, which differed some-
what from the instruction given in Sandstrom, told the jury: "When there are
no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption the law presumes that a
reasonable person intends all the natural, probable, and usual consequences
of his deliberate acts." 66
Some courts held that the jury would understand the instruction as a
permissive inference; 67 others thought an impermissible risk existed that the
jury would believe the burden of persuasion rested on the defendant. 8 In
Muller v. State69 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "the jury instruction
in this case states a rebuttable presumption .... It does not require the
defendant to come forward with an amount of proof greater than 'some'
evidence." 70 The court, however, did not make explicit whether its holding
was based on Wisconsin law or on what the Wisconsin jury believed the
instruction meant.7'
In the Seventh Circuit the petitioner in Pigee v. Israel72 argued that the
Wisconsin court's conclusion in Muller that the instruction stated a rebuttable
presumption was a decision on state law that bound the federal court. On that
65. See, e.g., State v. Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d 446, 451 n.3, 326 N.W.2d 232, 235 n.3 (1982); State v. Kemp,
106 Wis. 2d 697, 703-04, 318 N.W.2d 13, 17 (1982); State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 435, 307 N.W.2d 151, 158
(1981); Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 468, 289 N.W.2d 570, 579 (1980); Bergeron v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 595,
604-05, 271 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1978).
66. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 469, 289 N.W.2d 570, 580 (1980).
67. See, e.g., Genova v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 595, 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979).
68. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 875, 289 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 95 Wis. 2d 529, 290
N.W.2d 872 (1980). Adams was reversed on the basis of Muller v. State. See infra note 70 and accompanying
text.
69. 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).
70. Id. at 477, 289 N.W.2d at 584.
71. Id. at 479 n.2, 289 N.W.2d at 584 n.2 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Following the Muller decision, the
impediments to the availability of federal habeas corpus to review the decision of the Wisconsin court include
the following.
First, federal review would have been precluded in Muller had the Wisconsin court held that the defen-
dant's failure to object to the instruction constituted procedural default. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
The Wisconsin courts, however, considered the merits of the issue despite the absence of a defense objection in
the trial court.
Second, were the United States Department of Justice legislative proposals to be adopted, habeas corpus
would be unavailable because the issue would have been fully and fairly adjudicated in state court. Thus the
Wisconsin court's conclusion that the instruction stated a rebuttable presumption could be challenged only on
certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Third, the Wisconsin decision in Muller required the court to make findings of fact, presumed to be correct
in federal court as required by Sumner v. Mata, and conclusions of law properly reviewable by a federal court
unless the conclusion was one of state law.
72. 670 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1982). Pigee was the first Wisconsin habeas case to reach the Seventh Circuit
after Sandstrom. The petitioner was represented by the University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance
to Institutionalized Persons Program, a fact to be kept in mind in evaluating the critical analysis of the Pigee
decision.
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assumption he challenged the constitutionality of imposing a production
burden on the defendant when a finding that the requisite mental element was
present could only be based on the defendant's failure to produce evidence to
the contrary.73
The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the Wisconsin state court
decision was binding, stating that it is "a federal question as to which we are
not bound by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's determinations in Muller." 74
The court then held: "We think the instruction given in this case would be
interpreted by a reasonable jury as stating no more than a permissive infer-
''75
ence ....
Both the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Muller and the Seventh Circuit
court in Pigee concluded that the jury instruction created no impermissibly
great risk that ajury would understand that the burden of persuasion rested on
the defendant. The factual predicate of the Muller decision, however, is
apparently that the jury would understand that the instruction placed on the
defendant a burden merely of producing some contrary evidence. The factual
predicate of the Pigee decision is that the jury would understand the instruc-
tion to allow the jury merely to infer the ultimate fact, the intent to kill, from
the basic facts.
This result certainly does not indicate federal court deference to the
factual conclusions of the state court, and it produces an awkward situation
that appears in a subsequent Seventh Circuit case, Zelenka v. Israel.76 In
Zelenka the petitioner argued that the trial judge erred in giving the natural
and probable consequence instruction in a case in which the acts may have
been committed not by the defendant, but by his two confederates. Thus, the
defendant argued that the jury may have interpreted the instruction to permit
the jury to infer the defendant's intent to kill from the acts of others. 7 The
court acknowledged that if this had occurred, "the question arises whether
there exists a rational connection between the facts proved ... and the ulti-
mate fact presumed,, 78 citing Ulster County Court v. Allen. 79 The court held,
however, that the issue had not been exhausted in state court; it therefore
ordered the petition dismissed without prejudice, so that the petitioner could
later raise the issue again when state remedies had been exhausted. 80
To exhaust state remedies the petitioner in Zelenka must now bring a
state postconviction motion in the state trial court.8' There the trial judge will
face the unenviable task of deciding whether the "rational connection" re-
73. Id. at 692.
74. Id. at 694.
75. Id. at 695.
76. 699 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 422.
78. Id. at 423 n.2.
79. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
80. Zelenka v. Israel, 699 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. Wis. STAT. § 974.06 (1982-83).
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quirement for an Ulster County permissive inference has been met when the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that the instruction does not permit
inference of guilt and would not be so understood by a Wisconsin jury. One
can imagine ways of reconciling the inconsistent conclusions of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit on the meaning of the presumptive
intent instruction-for example, by reasoning that the rational connection
requirement of the Seventh Circuit holding (that the instruction permits infer-
ence) is also a requirement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision (that it
places a production burden on the defendant). But the mere statement of the
issue demonstrates the great confusion that currently exists.
The experience in Wisconsin and in the Seventh Circuit after the decision
in Sandstrom v. Montana illustrates the current unsatisfactory relationship
between federal and state courts regarding postconviction review of state
prisoner convictions. The difficulty is created by the Supreme Court's desire
to reaffirm important principles of federal constitutional law, such as the
requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to make
those decisions apply retroactively when they affect the integrity of the fact-
finding process, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the increasing desire
of the federal courts to play only a limited role in the postconviction review of
state prisoner convictions. These somewhat inconsistent objectives can be
fully achieved only if state courts willingly assume the responsibility for
implementing decisions such as Sandstrom by reversing the large number of
convictions that must be reversed if the decisions are to be applied retroac-
tively. If state courts are unwilling to take this responsibility, as they under-
standably tend to be, then the alternatives become more limited.
Engle v. Isaac invites state courts to invoke procedural rules that require
the defense to object at the appropriate time in the state trial court. If the state
courts enforce their procedural default rules, neither they nor the federal
courts will have to apply decisions such as Sandstrom retroactively except in
the rare case in which defense counsel had the foresight to make the objec-
tion. To date, however, state courts have been reluctant to rely on defense
counsel's failure to object as a basis for avoiding the merits of a claim that, if
true, casts serious doubt on the integrity of the fact-finding process.
A second possibility is for state courts to consider the merits, but to
distinguish the cases that come before them by finding minor differences in
the jury instruction's language that prevent the risk of jury confusion con-
demned in Sandstrom. This is Wisconsin's solution. Despite the conflicting
court decisions on how a jury would interpret the instruction, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that it places on the defendant only the burden of
producing some evidence. The court apparently concluded that the jury
understood that was what the instruction meant. Deciding the issue on the
merits does not preclude the possibility of federal habeas corpus review, but
does allow the federal court to limit its review by granting deference to the
state court findings of fact. The difficulty in Wisconsin is that this approach
would have required the Seventh Circuit to decide the constitutionality of the
19831
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so-called production burden, an issue left open in Ulster County Court v.
Allen. This probably explains why the Seventh Circuit made its own factual
finding that the Wisconsin jury understood the instruction to permit an infer-
ence of guilt and thus that the instruction was proper under Ulster County
Court v. Allen.
The cost of this latter approach is substantial. The important principle of
Sandstrom v. Montana, that the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement must
be clearly communicated to the jury, is reduced to a decision that only the
precise words used in Sandstrom create a risk of confusion. 82 After the
Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the presumptive intent instruction,
apparently on the ground that the jury would know that it placed only a small
production-of-evidence burden on the defendant, and after the Seventh
Circuit sustained it on the ground that the jury would know that it was a
permissive inference, a Wisconsin trial judge gave the same instruction in
another case.83 The Wisconsin Attorney General has asked the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals to reverse that conviction in the interest of justice, stating
that although he had argued that the instruction was not unconstitutional, he
had also promised the federal courts that it would never be used in the
future. 84 This is an obviously innovative way to avoid applying Sandstrom
retroactively by deciding that it was proper when given in the past but should
never be given in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Better methods clearly suggest themselves. The Supreme Court could
rethink the rule on retroactivity and apply important decisions like Sandstrom
prospectively. This would mean that the principle can be properly imple-
mented in the future8 5 and that courts-state and federal-can be saved the
trauma of having to acknowledge the principle but find ways to avoid revers-
ing the convictions that must be reversed if the decision is applied retroactive-
ly. This alternative has the obvious advantage of candor, a quality currently
82. See Remington, Foreword, 1981 WiS. L. REV. 513, 516:
The issue for the future is aptly put by Erica Eisinger in the conclusion to her Note where she
states: "Lower courts have to decide for themselves whether Sandstrom deals with semantics or
whether it signifies a concern with substantive issues of guilt or innocence." It is evident throughout
her Note that she believes there are important issues of guilt or innocence or of the seriousness of the
offense committed by the defendant and that the matter is not merely one of semantics.
If the reaction to Sandstrom is a new set of abstractions-probably styled as inferences--that gain
the blessing of a new generation of appellate courts, an opportunity will have been lost. Aided by such
research as there is ongoing with respect to jury comprehension of instructions, we ought to try for the
future to communicate to the jury in ways that clarify rather than confuse and aid rather than compli-
cate its task. Surely we have the capacity to do a great deal better than we have done in the past.
83. State v. Steien, No. 82-901-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. III filed Feb. 15, 1983) (unpublished summary
reversal order).
84. The court of appeals apparently refused the confession of error and later reversed the conviction in a
yet-to-be-reported decision that does not clearly address the reason for reversing when the instruction has been
held proper by both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
85. See Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d 690, 696 n.16 (7th Cir. 1982).
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lacking. It has the obvious disadvantage of denying the possibility of relief to
those who can make out a colorable claim that their conviction improperly
resulted from a constitutional violation affecting the integrity of the fact find-
ing process.
A second option is for the federal courts to apply principles like those of
Sandstrom retroactively and insist that state courts follow the decision, even
if that requires the reversal of a large number of state convictions. If state
courts refuse, the responsibility for applying constitutional principles should
be shared by the federal courts through habeas corpus review. This approach
has the obvious advantage of keeping the doors of the federal courts open to
those with meritorious claims that their convictions were obtained by means
that cast doubt on the integrity of the fact-finding process. Its disadvantage
lies in the continued active role of the federal courts at a time when both
internal and external critics prefer a reduction of that role.
The temptation is to adopt neither of these straightforward alternatives,
but rather for the Supreme Court to assert the constitutional principle, to hold
it retroactive, and then to avoid its impact by imposing increased procedural
obstacles that prevent state prisoners from asking for the relief that decisions
like Sandstrom apparently promise. This approach demeans the principle and
is no favor either to state courts that are asked to assume the entire burden of
giving retroactive effect to the constitutional principle or to state prisoners
whose expectations are raised, only to be disappointed. And it is no favor to
the development of federal habeas corpus law, which grows ever more com-
plex.
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